\[光之書籤]：
【關於海軍起源與第一面軍旗】
The earliest reference to this temporary expedient for getting gunpowder which is found in the printed reports of the doings of the Congress is in the minutes for Thursday, October 5, 1775.
It was then resolved to inform General Washington that the Congress had “received certain intelligence of the sailing of two north country built brigs, of no force, from England on the 11th of August last, loaded with arms, powder and other stores for Quebec without convoy, which it being of importance to intercept, ” Washington was requested to “apply to the Council of Massachusetts-Bay for the two armed vessels in their service, ” and send them “at the expense of the continent” after the brigs.
Moreover, he was informed that “the Rhode Island and Connecticut vessels of force will be sent directly to their assistance.” Further still, it was resolved that “the general be directed to employ the said vessels and others, if he judge necessary.” That was a very important set of resolutions in connection with the history of the navy.
...
On Tuesday, December 19th, the Congress still further showed their appreciation of the situation of affairs by resolving “that the Committee of Safety of Pennsylvania be requested to supply the armed vessels, which are nearly ready to sail, with four tons of gunpowder at the continental expense”; and, further, “that the said committee be requested to procure and lend the said vessels as many stands of small arms as they can spare, not exceeding 400.”
...
Then, on Friday, December 22, 1775.
The resolutions of the Congress shall be given in full, because it was upon this legal warrant that the American navy was founded. They were as follows:
“The committee appointed to fit out armed vessels, laid before congress a list of the officers by them appointed agreeable to the powers to them given by Congress, viz:
Esek Hopkins, esq. comander in chief of the fleet—
Dudley Saltonstall, Captain of the Alfred.
Abraham Whipple, Captain of the Columbus.
Nicholas Biddle, Captain of the Andrea Doria.
John Burrow Hopkins, Captain of the Cabot.
First lieutenants, John Paul Jones, Rhodes Arnold, —— Stansbury, Hoysted Hacker, Jonathan Pitcher.
Second Lieutenants, Benjamin Seabury, Joseph Olney, Elisha Warner, Thomas Weaver, —— McDougall.
Third Lieutenants, John Fanning, Ezekiel Burroughs, Daniel Vaughn.
Resolved, That the Pay of the Comander in-chief of the fleet be 125 dollars per calender month.
Resolved, That commissions be granted to the above officers agreeable to their rank in the above appointment.
Resolved, That the committee for fitting out armed vessels, issue warrants to all officers employed in the fleet under the rank of third lieutenants.
Resolved, That the said committee be directed (as a secret committee) to give such instructions to the commander of the fleet, touching the operations of the ships under his command, as shall appear to the said committee most conducive to the defence of the United Colonies, and to the distress of the enemy’s naval forces and vessels bringing supplys to their fleets and armies, and lay such instructions before the Congress when called for.”
...
With this accomplished, he turned toward the master of the ship, Capt. Dudley Saltonstall, and saluted.
And then, at a gesture from the captain, the executive officer of the ship, the immortal John Paul Jones, eagerly grasped the flag halliards, and while officers and seamen uncovered their heads, and the spectators cheered and cannon roared, he spread to the breeze the first American naval ensign.
The grand union flag of the colonies, a flag of thirteen stripes, alternate red and white, with the British jack in the field, and the pennant of the commander-in-chief, were then set, and the resolutions of the Congress read. The first American naval fleet was in commission.
\[書婭]：
總司令霍普金斯先生的表現似乎並不盡如人意，您的書中對他也有所批評。但同時，許多單獨行動的船隻和軍官卻屢創佳績，像是尼古拉斯·比德爾（Nicholas Biddle）在安德烈亞·多里亞號（Andrea Doria）上的英勇，以及約翰·巴里（John Barry）在列克星頓號（Lexington）上的表現。您認為這種對比，揭示了當時新生海軍怎樣的挑戰與特質？
\[史比爾斯先生]：
唉，霍普金斯總司令的確是一個令人遺憾的例子。
On the whole, the American fleet mounted eighty-eight guns to the eighty-nine of the British fleet, but they were inferior in weight of metal thrown, the largest being eighteen-pounders to the British twenty-four-pounders, while they needed 811 men for a full complement, but had only 700. And these were, from a man-o’-warman’s point of view, “a miserable set; indeed, the men on board the fleet in general are not equal to half their number of good men.”
He reached them at eleven o’clock, and the battle opened with a broadside from the British schooner Carleton.
...
The fleet of the enemy, though manned by picked men—by men known not only for their bravery, but for their skill in handling the guns—was obliged to draw off to get beyond the range of the smaller guns on the American fleet.
\[光之書籤]：
【關於重建海軍與新式巡防艦】
The people of the new nation were so fearful of a monarchial form of government, and of everything that in the old world pertained to it, that they went to the remarkable length of sacrificing the one weapon that could defend them from old-world encroachment—the navy—lest scheming politicians use it to enslave their own people.
...
On the Mediterranean coast of Africa were found a number of small Mohammedan states ruled by vassals of the Turk.
When one recalls how much superior the power of England was to that of all these pirates combined, it seems astounding that even she should have contributed to the blackmail, but the reason for her doing so may be found in the debates of Parliament of that day. Said Lord Sheffield in 1784:
“It is not probable that the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean. It will not be to the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them from the Barbary States.
The people who had called every legislator that spoke for the honor of the flag a blatant demagogue; the people who had feared naval tyrants, who had feared taxation, and who had argued that a small navy was worse than none—the peace-at-any-price men had been in a great majority. Now the publication of these facts opened the eyes of enough to make a majority the other way.
Nevertheless, so little regard had the members of Congress for the honor of the nation that “the resolution of the House of Representatives, that a naval force adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States ought to be provided, passed by a majority of two votes only.”
...
At that time the ablest shipbuilder in the United States was Joshua Humphreys, a Quaker, who for thirty years had been laying down keels at Philadelphia.
Going to General Knox, the Secretary of War, he made a notable statement. The number of ships which the United States could support, he said, would always be less than the number in any of the large European navies. It was therefore necessary that such ships as we did have should be fast-sailing enough to either fight or run at will, and when they chose to fight they must be equal, ship for ship, to anything afloat.
At Syracuse the project of destroying the Philadelphia by means of a small vessel well manned was mentioned to Decatur. He eagerly asked to be allowed to undertake the work with his schooner, the Enterprise, but the matter was not at once decided on. Later Lieut.
Charles Stewart, who commanded the brig Siren, asked for the place, but Preble had decided meantime that Decatur should do it and that the captured ketch Mastico should be employed because she was of a rig that could more easily enter the harbor of Tripoli without attracting attention.
...
When night drew on, the men were divided into five crews, of which three were to fire as many different parts of the ship, one was to hold her upper deck, and one to remain in and guard the ketch.
Meantime seven more volunteers had been taken from the Siren. When night had fully come the little ketch parted from the brig, and at 9 o’clock was sailing into the harbor by the channel in which the Philadelphia had been lost.
...
The moment for action had come. Springing to their feet, the Americans ran away with the line.
A Tripolitan climbed over the Philadelphia’s bows and cut the line loose, but the momentum already gained was great enough to land the ketch fair in place, where grapnels were thrown out, and with that Decatur cried, “Boarders away!” and sprang for the rail of the Philadelphia.
...
So swift and thorough was the work of the American boarders that in ten minutes the last show of resistance was ended.
And then a single rocket drew its line of flame high in air to tell the anxious friends without the bar that the Philadelphia was captured.
...
Decatur himself being the last to leave the burning ship. Indeed, the ketch was then drifting clear, and he had to jump to reach her. He had been on board but twenty-five minutes, all told.
...
That was the decisive moment of the battle.
While the British had been disabling all but three or four of the guns on the upper deck of the Bonhomme Richard, the men in the tops of the Yankee ship and the murderous fire of the nine-pounders, which Jones himself had worked, had gradually driven all the men off the upper deck of the Serapis.
...
\[光之書籤]：
【關於強制徵兵與1812年戰爭的原因】
To fully appreciate this, the chief cause of the War of 1812 between the United States and England, one must first know well how the crews of the British naval ships of that day were recruited and what manner of life these crews led when in actual service. As to the manner of recruiting, the facts are, no doubt, well known to almost every reader.
Gangs of men, under the lead of petty officers, and commonly piloted by a crimp, were sent ashore in home ports by the captain who found his ship short-handed. These gangs went to the resorts of seamen in the port where the ship happened to lie, and there took by force every English-speaking sailor they could find and carried him on board the warship.
It was in the matter of preserving what the officers called discipline—in keeping these unfortunate slaves in subjugation—that the real brutality of the British naval officers appeared. For the officers, who depended on clubs and manacles to recruit their crews, made no appeal to them save through their fears—used nothing to enforce an order but the cat-o’-ninetails.
...
As the Edinburgh Review for November, 1812, admitted, “they were dispersed in the remotest quarter of the globe, and not only exposed to the perils of service, but shut out, by their situation, from all hope of ever being reclaimed.” They were doomed to slavery for life.
...
Not only was the American walking in the street of a foreign city in immediate danger; the American ships on the high seas were stopped and stripped of their crews.
When the boat came, a British lieutenant climbed to the deck of the Chesapeake, and then, instead of producing a package of letters, he drew forth a written demand from his captain for the return of the sailors alleged to be British subjects. With this demand he also presented a copy of the circular issued by his admiral which ordered any British ship falling in with the Chesapeake to take the so-called deserters from her by force if necessary.
...
Instead of answering the hail, Captain Jones in a low voice passed the word to fire, and the next instant the spurting flames from the American guns were answered, as it were, in the same breath by those of the British, and the night battle was begun. It was then exactly seven o’clock.
...
Being wholly unprepared for action, the Chesapeake could make no reply, and for twelve minutes (some accounts say fifteen) she lay there helpless while the British seamen worked their guns.
---
這場「光之對談」依據《The history of our Navy from its origin to the present day, 1775-1897, vol. 1 (of 4)》文本進行，由書婭以約翰·倫道夫·史比爾斯先生的視角呈現。對談內容、風格及細節均力求貼近原著精神和作者寫作風格。
